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A sharp rise in cross-border investments in recent years has raised new ques- 
tions about the competitiveness of U.S. firms in world markets and the role of 
tax rules in determining the cost of capital for these firms. Tax rules affect the 
ability of  U.S. foreign subsidiaries to compete in foreign markets with local 
companies and with local subsidiaries of companies based in other countries. 
The primary channel through which taxes exert this influence is by  changing 
the cost of capital. 
The competitive ability of firms that face different costs of capital depends 
on how capital intensive they are and how sensitive the demand for their prod- 
uct is to the price. This paper does not attempt to look at specific products, but 
does estimate how tax rules alter the cost of capital for U.S. firms and compet- 
ing firms in a variety of foreign markets. 
Past comparative studies of the cost of capital have been concerned mainly 
with a comparison between countries of the cost of capital for domestic invest- 
ment.' This cost differs from country to country basically for two reasons. 
First, the domestic cost of funds may differ across countries. Second, capital 
income is taxed differently, at both the personal and the corporate levels, in 
each country. Although previous studies did not always reach identical conclu- 
sions because of methodological differences, a typical finding of these studies 
is that during the past decade, the cost-of-capital gap has been largely attribut- 
able to differences in the domestic cost of  funds, leaving little room for the 
role of tax systems. 
Joosung Jun is assistant professor of economics at Ewha University. 
The author thanks Martin Feldstein, James Hines, Glenn Hubbard, John Wilkins, Pete Wilson, 
and conference participants for comments and suggestions, and Tom Meyer for outstanding re- 
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1. See, e.g., King and Fullerton (1984). Bernheim and Shoven (1987), McCauley and Zimmer 
(1989), OECD (1991), and Jorgenson (1993). For  a survey of  the US.-Japan comparison, see 
Poterba (1991). 
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In the case of multinational investment, however, an international compari- 
son of the cost of capital is complicated by the possibility of overlapping tax 
jurisdictions and the possibility of raising investment funds in different coun- 
tries and transferring those funds between the parent and the subsidiary. Thus, 
comparing the cost of capital for domestic investments between countries may 
lead to very misleading implications for the competitiveness of multinationals. 
The objective of this paper is to estimate the degree to which international 
tax rules affect the cost of capital, with particular attention to U.S. firms com- 
peting with firms from other countries in major markets. The analysis involves 
dealing not only with multiple tax systems but also with the potential interac- 
tion of these systems. The paper first attempts to modify the conventional cost- 
of-capital formula in a way  that incorporates the impact of international tax 
rules;  then it estimates the cost of  capital for inbound and outbound  direct 
investment in 11 major investing countries.2 
The evidence presented in this paper suggests that, other things being equal, 
corporate tax rules related to foreign investment make U.S. firms operating in 
major foreign markets, on average, face about a 20 percent higher cost of capi- 
tal than domestic firms in the United States when U.S. source equity capital is 
used as the marginal source of investment funds. These U.S. firms may very 
likely face a higher cost of equity capital than do local firms in foreign markets. 
U.S. firms may also face a cost-of-capital disadvantage vis-A-vis firms from 
other countries in a given foreign market partly because the United States has 
no dividend imputation scheme and partly because the United States has rela- 
tively  strict  rules  about  the exemption  or deferral  of  home-country  tax  on 
foreign-source income and foreign tax credit utilization. 
The paper begins, in section 4.1, with a discussion of basic tax rules related 
to international investment. Section 4.2 presents a framework for deriving the 
cost of capital for foreign investment. Section 4.3 discusses the results based 
on the basic corporate tax systems. The implications of personal taxes and the 
dividend imputation scheme for the cost of equity transfers are presented in 
section 4.4, and the implications of international tax rules for financing foreign 
subsidiaries are presented in section 4.5, which is followed by a concluding 
section. 
2. The first attempt to estimate empirically the cost of capital for international investment was 
made by the OECD (1991). which presented an extensive set of international comparisons of the 
cost of  capital for both domestic  and international  investment in  24 member countries.  Since 
the OECD study takes the broad perspective of evaluating the neutrality of the tax systems in the 
member countries and suggesting ways to coordinate national tax policies, typically the results are 
reported in  an averaged format. This study also provides an excellent data source on tax rules 
related to domestic and international investment in OECD countries. 
The present paper, on the other hand, focuses on several specific tax propositions that arise in a 
very  specific setting, namely, competition  among firms of  different nationalities in a given lo- 
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4.1  Tax Rules Related to International Investment 
Income from international investment is subject to several layers of taxation. 
Host governments typically impose corporate taxes on income earned within 
their jurisdictions regardless of the ownership of capital. Many countries sub- 
ject foreign-source income to home-country personal income taxation. In cer- 
tain cases, corporate surtaxes are imposed by the home government. Countries 
also impose withholding taxes on income repatriated from abroad. 
Such overlapping tax jurisdictions subject certain foreign-source income to 
both home-country and host-country taxation. Such double taxation of interna- 
tional income should be a deterrent to international investment because of the 
implied high effective tax rates. In order to avoid double taxation of interna- 
tional investment income and encourage free flows of  capital, countries typi- 
cally provide some kind of tax relief on foreign-source income. The exact na- 
ture and extent of double-taxation relief differs across countries and types of 
in~ome.~ 
The most extreme, simplistic, and generous way to provide double-taxation 
relief is to exempt foreign-source income from home-country taxation. In this 
case, the only taxes charged for foreign-source income are the income and 
withholding taxes imposed by the host government. Only a few countries (e.g., 
the  Netherlands)  adopt  this  “territorial”  system  under  which  there  is  no 
residence-based taxation of foreign-source in~ome.~  As a result of bilateral tax 
treaties, however, this exemption method is, in practice, more prevalent than 
implied by  the tax statutes of each country. A pair of  countries can agree to 
exempt from domestic taxation  their residents’ income earned in the other 
country. 
Most countries assert the right to tax the income of their residents regardless 
of where the income is earned. Under this more conventional “residence” sys- 
tem, foreign-source income is subject to home-country taxation, but a credit 
or deduction is allowed for taxes paid to the host g~vernment.~ 
In  practice, no country allows unlimited  foreign tax credits. Foreign tax 
credits are typically limited to home-country tax liability on foreign-source 
income. Investors whose potentially creditable foreign taxes exceed the actual 
credit limit are said to be in  an “excess credit” position.6 Thus, foreign tax 
credit limitations are likely to be binding when the firm  invests in a high-tax 
3. The approaches used to avoid double taxation of foreign-source income have been well docu- 
mented in the literature (e.g., Auk and Bradford 1990;  OECD 1991). This section highlights some 
basic aspects of double-taxation conventions that will be referred to in later sections. 
4. France exempts 95 percent of foreign-source dividends from home-counhy taxation. 
5. Countries using the territorial system tend to tax passive foreign-source income (e.g, most 
6.  In some countries, these excess credits may be carried backward or forward (two or five years, 
portfolio income) on a residence basis. 
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country. If the foreign taxes paid are less than the limitation on credits, the firm 
is said to be in a “deficit credit” or “full credit” position. 
When a multinational invests in several foreign countries, it is normally al- 
lowed to pool the income repatriated  from all of these countries and credit 
against the domestic taxes due on this income any corporate and withholding 
taxes paid abroad on this income. In doing so, it can use excess credits from 
operations in one country to reduce any domestic taxes due on operations in 
another country. If, in total, its credits are sufficient to wipe out its domestic 
tax liabilities on its worldwide foreign operations, then no domestic corporate 
taxes are due. In this case, its final net income is the same as in the temtorial 
case. 
In addition to providing foreign tax credits, residence-system countries typi- 
cally allow their firms to defer home-country tax on certain types of foreign- 
source income until the income is repatriated. In general, active business in- 
come belongs to this category. Income from passive investment (dividends and 
interest, e.g.) is typically taxed on an accrual basis; however. And most coun- 
tries do not allow tax deferral for foreign-branch income. Tax deferral can be 
an important source of  tax benefits  since under certain circumstances it may 
lower the effective tax rate on foreign investment. 
The asymmetric treatment of a given economic activity across different ju- 
risdictions may significantly influence the way multinationals allocate capital 
between  domestic and foreign  operations.’  Local investment  incentives  and 
financing  sources in the host country will further complicate the investment 
and financing decisions of this firm. 
The common notion of tax-induced location choice is based on the compari- 
son of  after-tax rates of  return in different places. Thus, the argument goes, 
given the pretax rates of return, the statutory tax rates and investment incen- 
tives in each country will determine its attractiveness as an investment location 
for international investors. The main flaw with such conventional wisdom is its 
failure to recognize the additional layers of taxation that may be imposed on 
international  investment,  as discussed  earlier.  When  choosing  between  the 
home country and a foreign country as a location for investment, a multina- 
tional may compare the effective tax rate on domestic investment in the home 
country, not with that on domestic investment in the host country, but with the 
total effective tax burden on international investment, which is determined by 
the  home-country  tax  treatment  of  foreign-source  income  as well  as host- 
country taxes. Even under the exemption system, in which the home country 
does not tax foreign-source income, the effective tax rate on international in- 
vestment can differ from that for host-country competitors due to the withhold- 
ing tax on repatriated income. 
7. There have been a growing number of studies analyzing tax effects on multinational incen- 
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4.2  Cost of Capital for Foreign Investment 
This section sets out a framework within which the cost of capital for foreign 
investment is estimated. The focus is on the way in which tax rules related to 
international investment influence the cost of capital. 
4.2.1  Basic Model 
All shareholders are assumed to live and be taxed in the home country. The 
foreign subsidiary is wholly owned by the domestic parent, which maximizes 
shareholder wealth. While the subsidiary can finance its investment through a 
variety of  sources, the model focuses on the case where the subsidiary uses 
equity transfers from the parent as the basic source of funds for its investment, 
in order to highlight the differential tax effects on domestic and foreign invest- 
ment given the same cost of funds. There are two sources of equity funds for 
the parent  to finance  its  domestic investment  or transfers to the  subsidiary: 
retained earnings and new share issues. The subsidiary can also retain earnings 
to finance its investment.* 
There is no uncertainty in the model, and all tax rates are perceived  to be 
constant over time. As a notational convention, an asterisk superscript will de- 
note host-country or subsidiary variables. 
Capital-market equilibrium for the parent is attained when the shareholder 
earns his required rate of return p: 
(1)  pv, = (1 -  m>D,  + (1 -  z)  (V,,,  -  V, -  NJ, 
where V,  is the market value of the firm's equity at the beginning of period t, 
D, is dividend payments in period  t, N, is the value of new equity issued in 
period  t, and  m  and  z  are the  effective tax rates  on dividends  and  capital 
gains, respectively. 
Solving equation  (1) subject to an appropriate transversality condition, we 
can express the value of the parent V,  as the present discounted value of after- 
tax dividends, net of the present value of new share issues: 
The parent maximizes its value subject to various constraints. 




D, + N,* + T, + I, = Of*  + F(K,) + N, 
0,' + TI*  + I,* = F'(K**)  + N,*, 
8. Alternative financing sources are discussed in detail in section 4.5. 100  Joosung Jun 
where T,  is the total tax due in the home country, including taxes on repatriated 
subsidiary earnings, TI*  is the host-country  tax liability, and I,, I,',  F(K,), and 
F(K)  denote investments and profits for domestic and foreign operations. 
The global budget constraint for the parent can be derived by adding equa- 
tions (3) and (4): 
(5)  T, + Tf*  + I, + I,*  + D, = F(K,) + P(Ki*)  + N,. 
Other constraints include: 
(6)  D, 2  0, 
(7) 
(8)  Of*  2 0, 
(9) 
AJ, 2 N,  where N 5 0, 
N,* 2 A', where A'  5  0, 
K,,, = (1 -  6)Kf  + I,, 
K,,,  = (1 -  6*)K,*  + I,*. 
Equations (6) and (8) are nonnegativity conditions for dividends. Equation 
(7) represents  restrictions on the parent's  ability to repurchase shares. Simi- 
larly, equation (9) reflects restrictions on the subsidiary's ability to repatriate 
tax-exempt funds to the parent9 Equations (10) and (1  1) denote the evolution 
of the capital stock for the parent and the subsidiary, respectively, where 6 and 
6* are the rates of economic depreciation. 
Tax Parameters 
Taxable profits of the parent and the subsidiary are 
(12) 
(13) 
IT: = F(Kf) -  ijTK;+,, 
~TT'  = F(K,*) -  6 T*KT;,, 
where KT+, is net value of the parent firm's capital stock for tax purposes at the 
start of period tt  1. Note that K:+, will evolve along different paths depending 
on the depreciation method (e.g., straight line or declining balance) used and, 
in any case, will evolve differently than the actual capital stock, K,,,. The quan- 
tity  is the rate of tax depreciation allowed in the home country. For foreign 
investment, the same variables are used with the asterisk superscript. 
The tax liability of the parent company in the home country is the sum of 
the taxes due on its own operations and the taxes due upon repatriation  of 
subsidiary profits: 
9. The subsidiary can repatriate its equity capital (N* < 0) as well as its earnings. In principle, 
the redemption of  equity capital  is tax exempt, while the repatriated earnings are taxable in  the 
home country. In order to prevent a firm  from treating all repatriated funds as equity capital, as a 
general rule all remissions are treated as taxable earnings as long as accumulated repayments are 
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(14) 
Taxes due by the parent on domestic operations are 
T, = TP  + TY. 
(15)  TF  = TIT:  + (W -  c)DF, 
where T is the home-country statutory corporate tax rate, w is the home-country 
withholding rate on dividends, and c is the rate of dividend imputation credit 
available in the home country. The variable 0," is parent dividend payments 
gross of any imputation credits: 
It is also convenient to define the dividends, grossed up at the corporate tax 
rate: 
If the home government provides the full dividend credit (c = T), 0,"  equals 
DP. If the country adopts a classical system (c = 0), 0," equals D,, the net div- 
idend. 
The tax liability of the subsidiary in the host country is 
(18)  = .*IT:*  $.  (W* -  C*)F, 
where grossed-up subsidiary dividends are defined as 
D' 
DF* = 1 -c*' 
The parent firm may also owe taxes on repatriated subsidiary profits (T;).'O 
Depending on the treatment of  foreign-source income in the home country, 
TY  will take on different values: 
1. Under a territorial system or a treaty that exempts foreign-source income 
from home-country taxation, there is no home-country tax on foreign-source 
dividends: 
(21)  T; = 0. 
2. Under  a tax  credit  system, foreign-source dividends may  face home- 
country corporate surtaxes (deficit credit position). Assuming that the home 
country uses the same tax base as the host country, which is DP*, 
10. Deferral of home-country taxes on unrepatriated foreign-source dividends is implicitly as- 
sumed in the model. 102  Joosung Jun 
-  (w*  -  c*)]D:'.  o}. 
(7 -  T*)  (1 -  C*) 
(22) 
3. Under a deduction system, 
(231  Ts = T [1 -  (W* -  C*)]DF*. 
Before proceeding to the expression for the cost of capital, it will prove 
convenient to define two further parameters. First, let u be the total tax rate on 
repatriated foreign-source dividends. Depending on which of the three regimes 
for the treatment of foreign-source income is in force in the home country, u 
will take on different values, as shown in table 4.1. 
Column (1) denotes the second term of equation (1  8), which reflects host- 
country taxes on repatriated dividends. Column (2) reproduces equations (2  1)- 
(23). The total tax burdens on foreign-source dividends are summarized in 
column (3). Notice that the value of  u essentially  determines the degree to 
which international tax rules affect the cost of capital in the model. 
The other parameter, y, is the tax discrimination variable. It indicates dis- 
crimination between retained earnings and new equity finance in the parent 
company and is given by 
1-m 
.  .. _.  - -~ 
= (1 -  z)  (1 + w -  c)' 
The Cost of Capital 
The cost of capital is the pretax rate of return that a corporation must earn 
in order to pay the rate of return required by the providers of capital. The cost 
of capital, p and p*,  depends on the discount rate as well as several other con- 
siderations such as the tax treatment of capital income and the depreciation of 
the investment asset: 
(p' + 8*)  (1 -  z*>  p* = 
1 -  T* 
where p' is the appropriate discount rate and z  and z*  are tax savings from 
depreciation allowances in the home and host countries, respectively. 
The cost of capital critically depends on the discount rate, which is in turn 
determined by  the source of finance and relevant tax parameters. Table 4.2 
presents discount rates under alternative regimes of  financing domestic and 
foreign investment. 
If the parent uses retained earnings as the source of financing domestic in- 
vestment, shareholders can accumulate wealth at a rate of return that is taxed 
by  a capital gains tax rather than a dividend tax. If  the after-corporate-tax, 
before-personal-tax yield of a project is p', then the shareholder would require Table 4.1  Effective Tax Rate on Foreign-Source Dividends Dc* (u) 
Host-Country Taxes 
Home-Country Tax System  (1) 
Home-Country Taxes 
(2) 
Total Tax on Foreign-Source Dividends 
(3)= ( 1)+(2) 
Exemption system  w* -  c*  0  w* -  C* 
(7 -  ?*) (1 -  C*)  (7 -  ?*) (1 - 
Credit system  w* -  c*  -  (w*  -  c*). 0) 
Deduction system  w* -  c*  7  [1 -  (W*  -  C*)]  (w*  -  C*) + 7 [I -  (w* -  C*)] 104  Joosung Jun 
Table 4.2  Discount Rate under Alternative Financing Regimes 
Regime  Discount Rate 
Domestic investment 
1.  Financed by parent retained earnings  P41 -  z) 
2.  Financed by parent new equity 
PKl -  z) 
Y 
Foreign invesrment 
3.  Financed by subsidiary retained earnings  p*4l -  z*) 
4.  Financed by transfer of parent retained earnings 
5. Financed by transfer of parent new equity 
Note: See table 4.1 for the values of  u. See eq. (24) for value of y. 
that p’ (1 -  z) = p.  The discount rate for the retained earnings is given by p’ = 
p/( 1 -  z),  as shown on line 1  of table 4.2.” 
When the parent  finances investment by new share issues, the shareholder 
receives (1 -  m)p‘/(l + w -  c)  as the after-tax dividend yield.’? In equilib- 
rium, this yield must be equated with p,  the required rate of return. The parent’s 
discount rate for new equity is, therefore, given by p’ = (1 + w -  c)p/(l - 
m),  which is the same expression as the one shown on line 2.‘) 
Consider now the appropriate discount rates for the finance of foreign invest- 
ment. When the subsidiary uses its retained earnings to finance the investment, 
the cost of capital is defined to be the same as that for domestic investment 
financed through retained earnings in the host country.I4 
If the subsidiary draws funds from the parent, the discount rate should reflect 
the additional taxes associated with repatriated dividends. As indicated on lines 
4 and 5 of table 4.2,  this international tax effect can be summarized by  the 
term 1/(  1 -  u), where u is the effective tax rate on foreign-source dividends as 
described in table 4.1. From the perspective of the parent, whose objective is 
to maximize the wealth of its domestic shareholders, the net receipts from a 
dollar of repatriation equal 1 -  u dollars. Since the opportunity cost of trans- 
fenng a dollar to the subsidiary is the dollar equivalent of  forgone domestic 
I I. If the required rate of  return p is set to be (1 -  m)i. the opportunity cost of  investing in the 
firm, where  i is the interest rate, then  p’ equals  i/[(l - m)/(l -  z)]  as in  King and Fullerton 
(1984.23). 
12. Note that net dividend payments are grossed up at the net imputation (c -  w)  rate. 
13. Again, if p is set to be (1 -  m)i, p‘ = (1 + w -  c)i. 
14. This assumption will make the empirical results of this study comparable to those in OECD 
(199  I). Jun (1989)  defines the discount rate for subsidiary earnings in an alternative way that links 
the yield on foreign investment and the opportunity cost of domestic investment. 105  The Impact of  International Tax Rules on the Cost of Capital 
Table 4.3  Impact of International Tax Rules on Discount Rate: An Example 
Host-Country System 
Classical, or  No 
Dividend Credit to  Full Dividend Credit  Limited Dividend 
Foreign Firms  to Foreign Firms  Credit to Foreign 
(c* = 0)  (C*  = T*)  Firms (c* = w*) 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
Home-Country System  u  1/(1 -  u)  U  1/(1 -  u)  u  1/(1 -  u) 
Exemption  0.05  1.05  -0.35  0.74  0  1  .00 
Credit  0.17  1.20  0.10  1.11  0.16  1.19 
Deduction  0.53  2.13  0.33  I .49  0.50  2.00 
Note: T = 0.5, T*  = 0.4, w* = 0.05. 
investment, the parent should require that foreign investment earn a yield at 
the rate of 1/(  1 -  u)  times the rate of return required on domestic investment. 
The magnitude of u depends on the tax treatment of foreign-source divi- 
dends both in the home and host countries as shown in table 4.1.  Table 4.3 
shows an example in which the impact of international tax rules on the discount 
rate (1/( 1 -  u))  is calculated using realistic parameter values under different 
tax systems in both the home and the host countries. Each column reflects a 
different extent to which a multinational receives dividend imputation credits 
for corporate taxes paid to the host government. 
In order to focus on the impact of the home-country tax system on the dis- 
count rate, consider first the most common case, where there are no dividend 
imputation credits available for foreign firms (col. [  l]).”  Under the exemption 
system in the home country, u = w*  and the discount rate for foreign invest- 
ment will be 5 percent larger than that for domestic investment using the same 
source of funds. Under the credit system, however, there arises a home-country 
surtax at the rate of  17 cents per dollar of dividends paid by the subsidiary. 
This surtax translates into a 20 percent higher discount rate. The impact of the 
deduction method on the discount rate is more than twice that of the exemp- 
tion method. 
The tax treatment of repatriated dividends in the host country may also sig- 
nificantly influence the discount rate. Withholding taxes on dividend payments 
to foreign parent companies are typically reduced by a tax treaty (typically by 
5-15  percent) and do not show much variation among countries. A potentially 
more important and more uncertain aspect of host-country taxation of subsid- 
iary dividends is the extent to which a country extends dividend imputation 
credits to foreign  shareholders. Few  countries provide  unlimited  dividend 
15. This is either because the host country does not have any imputation scheme (the classical 
system) or because the host country denies foreign shareholders such credits. 106  Joosung Jun 
credits to foreign  shareholders. Among the major imputation countries, the 
United Kingdom has the statutory rules that are the most generous toward for- 
eign parents receiving dividends from their subsidiaries but still only a half- 
credit is allowed for the residents of a limited number of countries. 
Multinationals  may,  however, have substantial flexibility in avoiding such 
statutory restrictions. A subsidiary may  pay dividends to another subsidiary 
located either in a country that receives more favorable treatment or even in 
the same host country. If a multinational succeeds in receiving the full imputa- 
tion credits available, this firm can substantially lower the discount rate for 
foreign investment as shown in column (2). 
Column (3) depicts an example of partial credits. In any case, the impact of 
dividend imputation credits available in the host country on the cost of capital 
for foreign investment is likely to be unpredictable and variable across coun- 
tries.16 
4.2.2  Measuring the Cost of Capital 
In the remainder of the paper, various cost-of-capital measures for U.S. firms 
and their major competitors in foreign markets are presented. The methodol- 
ogy used to calculate the cost of capital in this paper closely follows the ap- 
proach developed by King and Fullerton (1984) and OECD (1991). 
There are three rates of return on an investment, p,  I; and s:  the pretax rate 
of  return, the after-corporate-tax  rate of  return, and the after-corporate-and- 
personal-tax rate of return, respectively. This study adopts the “fixed?  ap- 
proach in which for a given real interest rate (r),  the pretax rate of return (p) 
is calculated using the tax code. A common real interest rate of 5 percent is 
assumed for the purpose of focusing on the tax effects on the cost of capital 
and maintaining  comparability between  countries. Thus, the cost-of-capital 
measures reported in the following sections are the pretax rates of return neces- 
sary to earn a given after-corporate-tax  rate of  return  (real interest rate) of 
5 percent. 
In the base case estimation, personal taxes are ignored. In practice, the role 
of personal taxes in determining the cost of capital may be less clear in the 
case of the parent-subsidiary relationship than the shareholder-parent relation- 
ship. The parent, as a single shareholder, may be  subject to different rules 
and incentives than individual shareholders. The most important aspect of the 
parent’s  being  a  shareholder  of  the  foreign  subsidiary  is  the  role  of  the 
dividend imputation scheme in the home and host countries in determining 
the cost of  capital for foreign investment, which is fully discussed in section 
4.4. 
While the base case focuses on all-equity financing regimes, debt financing, 
often ignored in the literature, has been an important source of foreign invest- 
ment. Especially significant is the presence of local borrowing by foreign sub- 
16. See section 4.4 for more discussion of this issue. 107  The Impact of International Tax Rules on the Cost of Capital 
Table 4.4  Cost of Capital for U.S. and Competing Firms in Foreign Markets 
Local  us.  Japanese  U.K.  German 
Firms  Firms  Firms  Firms  Firms 










































































sidiaries. Section 4.5 discusses the implications of  international taxation for 
the financing policy of subsidiaries. 
A common inflation rate of  4.5 percent is used everywhere. Thus, all the 
variations in the cost of capital for foreign investment across countries are due 
purely to differences in their corporate tax systems. For comparability, the val- 
ues for tax parameters are drawn from the OECD and relate to the systems in 
force as of January 1, 1991.17  A 11  X  11 matrix of the cost of  capital for 11 
countries investing in each other is calculated under each financing regime. 
These 11 countries are Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands,  Sweden,  Switzerland, the  United  Kingdom,  and  the  United 
States. While the OECD reports various average measures across its member 
countries, the main focus of this study is on U.S. firms competing with firms 
from other countries in foreign markets. The major findings are described in 
the following sections. The appendix reports the full cost-of-capital matrices 
for the base case. 
4.3  Effects of the Basic Corporate Tax Systems 
This section focuses on the effects on the cost of capital of the basic corpo- 
rate statutes in the sample countries. Results based on possible behavioral re- 
sponses by multinationals are reported in the following sections. 
4.3.1  Domestic Investment versus Foreign Investment 
Compare first the costs of capital for domestic investment and foreign invest- 
ment. Table 4.4 presents the cost of capital for U.S.,  Japanese, U.K., and Ger- 
17. For a complete list of data parameters, see OECD (1991,220-33). 108  Joosung Jun 
man firms as well as local firms  operating in the 11 sample countries. In this 
base case, parent retained earnings are assumed to be the marginal source of 
funds for both domestic and foreign investment. 
Column (1) reports the cost of capital for domestic investment. This result 
can be comparable to traditional international comparisons of the cost of capi- 
tal except that this study isolates the impact of corporate taxes from other in- 
fluences. The effects of corporate tax rules on the cost of capital differentials 
for domestic investment between countries do not appear to be large, which is 
in  line with the findings of  most previous studies. Across countries, the re- 
quired pretax rates of return on domestic investment are higher in Japan, Ger- 
many, Italy, and Australia than in other countries, reflecting their relatively high 
corporate tax rates. U.S. domestic firms face a lower cost of capital (7.6 per- 
cent) than Japanese domestic firms (9.0 percent) because of relatively high 
corporate tax rates in Japan. Note that several studies have found that U.S. 
firms are at a competitive disadvantage relative to firms in Japan. In McCauley 
and Zimmer (1989) and Bernheim and Shoven (1987), for example, the cost- 
of-capital gap in 1988 was 4.0 and 7.0 percent, respectively. The cost-of-capital 
advantage of U.S.  firms in this study (1.4 percent),  therefore,  reiterates the 
significance of  the difference in the cost of funds between the two countries in 
the 1980s. 
Now consider the cost of capital for firms from major investing countries. 
As shown in column (2),  U.S. firms face a significantly higher cost of equity 
capital for foreign investment than for domestic investment. In the sample host 
countries, U.S. firms face about a 20 percent higher cost of capital on average 
than in the case of  U.S. domestic investment (9.3 vs. 7.6 percent). In Japan, 
the cost of capital for foreign investment is about 40 percent higher than that 
for domestic investment in the U.S. (10.6 vs. 7.6 percent). 
Firms  from  other countries also face  similar tax  costs when  they invest 
abroad. Columns (3)-(5)  indicate that the average costs of capital for Japanese, 
U.K.,  and German firms investing in the sample countries are about 20-30 
percent higher than for domestic investment in their home countries. Corporate 
taxes seem to play an important role in affecting the competitiveness of firms 
in foreign markets, contrary to the case when the costs of  capital for domestic 
investment are compared. 
4.3.2  Competition with Local Firms 
The results in table 4.4 also indicate that because of the tax costs associated 
with foreign investment, firms investing abroad may very likely face a higher 
cost of capital than local competitors. For example, a 20 percent higher cost 
of capital for foreign investment would put U.S. multinationals in a disadvanta- 
geous position in most foreign markets. Comparing columns (1) and (2)  indi- 
cates, in fact, that U.S.  firms face a higher cost of capital than their local coun- 
terparts in every sample country. Similar results are obtained for firms from 
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Table 4.5  Cost of Capital for Foreign Firms Operating in Japan, the United 
Kingdom, and Germany 
In the United 
In Japan  Kingdom  In Germany 
Home Country  (1)  (2)  (3) 
United States  10.6  8.6  7.4 
Japan  9.0  11.8  8.2 
Canada  11.1  6.0  7.9 
France  11.7  8.0  5.4 
Germany  12.8  7.7  9.5 
Netherlands  10.6  6.3  8.2 
United Kingdom  11.3  1.7  7.8 
Italy  11.8  14.0  6.4 
Sweden  10.6  6.3  8.2 
Switzerland  10.6  6.3  8.2 
Australia  13.9  7.7  7.4 
Average  11.5 
(foreign investment) 
8.3  7.5 
Because of the tax costs associated with international investment, U.S. firms 
face a higher cost of equity capital than do local firms in Japan (10.6 vs. 9.0 
percent), according to the calculations that underlie the figures reported in ta- 
ble 4.4.  As  noted above, Japanese firms have enjoyed a cost-of-capital advan- 
tage over U.S. firms due mainly to the difference in the cost of funds between 
the two countries. Since the results reported here are based on the assumption 
that there are no cost-of-funds differentials between countries, the negative 
impact of international  tax rules on the cost of capital can be interpreted as an 
additional source of disadvantage for U.S. firms operating in Japan when these 
firms draw transfers from their domestic parents. 
4.3.3  Competition among Foreign Firms 
In a foreign market, U.S. firms compete not only with local firms but also 
with firms from other investing countries. Table 4.5 shows the cost-of-capital 
measures for firms from different countries operating in  Japan, the United 
Kingdom, and Germany. 
In Japan, the variation of the cost of capital across investing countries is not 
large. This is mainly because the high Japanese corporate tax rate dominates 
the tax rates in investor countries in determining the overall effective tax rate 
on foreign investment in Japan. The cost of capital for U.S. firms (10.6 percent) 
is not greater than for firms from other countries, though the difference is not 
large. One interesting observation is that those firms whose cost of  capital is 
higher than that for U.S. firms are from countries with a dividend credit scheme 
(Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Italy, and 
Australia). 
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In other countries, the cost of capital for U.S. firms is close to the sample 
average. Note that the cost of capital for foreign firms in the United Kingdom 
shows relatively greater variation across investor countries. This is because low 
U.K. corporate taxes are often dominated by home-country taxation of U.K.- 
source income in determining the cost of capital. 
4.4  Personal Taxes and the Dividend Imputation Scheme 
The costs of two sources of parent equity funds-new  equity and retained 
earnings-are  different mainly for two tax reasons, as discussed in section 4.2. 
First, a personal tax advantage for capital gains relative to dividends will lower 
the cost of retained  earnings for the parent.  On the other hand, a dividend 
imputation scheme will make the cost of parent new equity lower than that for 
parent retained earnings for financing domestic investment. 
4.4.1  Effects of the Dividend Imputation Scheme in the Home Country 
Some countries try to restrict investors’ ability to use the dividend imputa- 
tion  scheme on dividends from domestic  corporations  financed  by earnings 
from abroad. Typically, countries require that dividends eligible for the divi- 
dend imputation scheme be less than the firm’s after-tax profits from domestic 
operations.  Unless  a firm desires an abnormally  high  dividend payout rate, 
however, this restriction is unlikely to be binding. 
If  shareholders in the countries with the dividend imputation  scheme are 
allowed to take such dividend imputation credits for foreign-source dividends, 
firms from some of these countries can possibly lower the cost of capital for 
foreign investment by using parent new equity instead of parent retained eam- 
ings as the source of transfers. Table 4.6 presents the cost-of-capital measures 
that reflect personal taxes and dividend credits for firms investing in Japan. 
Columns  (1)  and  (2)  show  the  impact  of  the  home-country  imputation 
scheme on the relative costs of capital for the two sources of equity transfers. 
Personal taxes are ignored to highlight the influence of the dividend imputation 
scheme. For firms from countries with the classical system, therefore, the cost 
of capital is the same for the two cases. Firms from countries with a dividend 
imputation scheme have a clear advantage over U.S. firms. Without dividend 
credit benefits, the cost of capital for U.S. firms is at the low end of the spec- 
trum (col. [l]). With credits available, however, the average cost of capital over 
firms from imputation countries is 5.4 percent, about half of the cost of capital 
for US.  firms (col. [2]). This result suggests the potential importance of integ- 
rating personal and corporate taxation in enhancing US.  competitiveness. 
Columns (3) and (4) report the results that combine the effects of personal 
taxes and dividend credits. Overall, the cost of capital is lower here than in the 
base case since the nominal required rate of return is defined to be (1 -  m)i in 
the calculations. The effects of  relatively  lower effective tax rates on capital 
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Table 4.6  Personal Taxes and Dividend Imputation Credits in the Home 
Country: Firms Operating in Japan 
No Personal Taxes  Personal Taxes 
Parent  Parent 
Retained  Parent New  Retained  Parent New 
Earnings'  Equityb  Earnings'  Equityb 
Home Country  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Japanese domestic  9.0  9.0  6.6  11.2 
United States  10.6  10.6  5.3  7.8 
Canada  11.1  7.3  2.6  4.2 
France  11.7  6.8  7.9  17.7 
Germany  12.8  2.4  1.8  2.4 
Netherlands  10.6  10.6  0.4  10.6 
United Kingdom  11.3  6.4  4.9  3.9 
Italy  11.8  4.6  6.3  7.3 
Sweden  10.6  10.6  6.4  8.5 
Switzerland  10.6  10.6  3.0  10.6 
Australia  13.9  4.7  4. I  1.6 
Average  11.5  7.5  4.3  7.5 
(foreign investment) 
"Transfer of parent retained earnings. 
Transfer of parent new equity with dividend credits for foreign-source  dividends. 
imputation scheme has a significantly offsetting impact in those countries with 
such a scheme. In Australia and the United Kingdom, parent new equity is still 
the cheaper of the two sources. 
In the presence of widespread foreign financing sources (see the next sec- 
tion) and international portfolio investment with the possibility of  tax eva- 
sion,I9 the role of personal taxes in determining the required rate of return on 
foreign investment in not as clear as in the model presented earlier. In principle, 
there must be no dividend credits when there is no dividend taxation. However, 
the corporate veil between domestic shareholders and foreign investment may 
be thick and complex enough for multinationals to somehow manage to get 
some dividend credits even when personal taxation on the level of domestic 
shareholders does not affect their cost of  capital. If  this is the case, the first 
two columns of table 4.6 will represent a more realistic picture of the cost-of- 
capital gap across financing sources and investor countries. 
4.4.2  Effects of the Dividend Imputation Scheme in the Host Country 
The presence of the dividend imputation scheme provides incentives to re- 
duce the cost of  capital, not only for the subsidiaries of the domestic parent, 
19. For a discussion of  tax effects on international portfolio investment, see Gordon and Jun 
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Table 4.7  Dividend Imputation Credits to US.  Firms in the Host Country 
Limited Credits  Full Credits 


































Average  9.3  8.2 
(foreign investment) 
but also for the local  subsidiaries of  firms in  other countries. As discussed 
in section 4.2,  most countries deny dividend credits to foreign shareholders. 
However, some firms may have enough flexibility to avoid such statutory re- 
strictions. Table 4.7 presents results based on the assumption that U.S. firms 
can get the full credits available in foreign countries. Column (1) produces 
column (2) of table 4.4,  the base case result based on the notion that restrictions 
in the tax statutes are strictly binding.*O 
In most sample countries with the imputation scheme, U.S. firms can lower 
the cost of capital.*' In the United Kingdom, there is no change in the cost of 
capital, which is not surprising. The United Kingdom taxes corporate income 
rather  lightly, and benefits from the full credit (c = 0.250) are not a large 
addition because U.S. firms are already allowed to take a half-credit (0.125). 
U.S. firms, therefore, must still face a U.S. surtax, and the total effective tax 
rate is determined mostly by the U.S. taxes. On average, U.S. firms can lower 
their cost of capital about 12 percent (from 9.3 to 8.2 percent) in the sample 
countries. 
4.5  Implications for Local Financing Sources 
In the face of a high cost of  capital for foreign investment financed through 
equity transfers by the parent, the subsidiary may seek alternative sources of 
funds. First, parent transfers can be made in debt instead of equity. These two 
types of transfer differ in terms of the rate of withholding tax in the host coun- 
try and the tax treatment of repatriated  income in the home country. While 
20. Note that personal taxes in the home country are ignored for the results in this table. 
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many countries in the sample adopt the exemption method for foreign-source 
dividends,2z  all sample countries adopt the credit method for foreign-source 
interest. In the host countries, on the other hand, interest payments face lower 
withholding taxes than dividend payments in many cases. The cost-of-capital 
difference between these two types of  transfers in the actual calculation is 
small and not separately 
4.5.1  Local Debt Financing 
It is likely that more important alternative sources of funds lie in the host 
country Local borrowing, which is ignored by most previous studies of foreign 
investment, has been an important source of funds for foreign investment. At 
the end of 1989, the share of local and other foreign borrowing in total external 
finance for U.S. firms operating abroad was 60.3 percent. The corresponding 
figure for foreign firms operating in the United States was 71.2 percent. 
In  general, because interest payments  are tax  deductible, debt financing 
should be preferred to equity financing as far as taxes are concerned. Column 
(3) of  table 4.8 shows that the cost of  capital for foreign investment financed 
by  local borrowing is much lower than that for equity financing regimes. The 
deduction benefits are proportional to the marginal corporate tax rate in a coun- 
try, and debt financing is particularly attractive in Japan and Germany because 
of their relatively high corporate tax rates. 
Local debt may be an especially attractive way  of financing foreign invest- 
ment for the following reasons. First, the tax cost of not using debt is much 
higher for foreign investment than for domestic investment, as shown in col- 
umn (5) of table 4.8. For domestic investment in the United States, the tax cost 
of using equity financing is 5.0 percent. For U.S. firms operating in Japan, for 
example, the cost can be as large as 9.0 percent. This result reflects the tax 
costs associated with international investment. 
Firms usually do not raise the leverage ratio as much as tax benefits would 
suggest because of various nontax costs associated with leverage, such as per- 
ceived bankruptcy or agency costs. In  the case of  multinational investment, 
however, the nontax cost of using debt may not be as significant as for domestic 
investment. A multinational may  face less risk of  default, since it can pool 
relatively independent risks from its operations in several different countries 
and so be able to borrow more. In addition, if it can use its combined assets as 
collateral for loans, regardless of  which affiliate does the borrowing, then it 
can concentrate its borrowing in the country where the deductions are most 
valuable. 
Thus, the tax benefits of  an interest deduction may  be a much more im- 
portant determinant of  corporate leverage for a foreign subsidiary than for a 
22. These countries are Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and 
23. In most sample countries, debt transfer has a slight edge over equity transfer. 
Australia, assuming a tax treaty for residence-system countries. Table 4.8  Advantage of Local Financing for U.S. Multinationals 
Tax Cost of Not Using 
Transfer of Parent  SREa with  Local Debt  Tax Cost of Not Using SRE"  Local Debt 
Equity  Tax Deferral  Financing  ((  1  )-(2))  ((1)-(3)) 
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purely domestic firm. In  addition, foreign borrowing is an important way  to 
hedge against exchange risks associated with foreign-source income. 
When borrowing abroad, a U.S. multinational may have an incentive to con- 
centrate its borrowing where tax benefits are large. Japan, Germany, Italy, and 
Australia  are  more  attractive places  for  foreign  borrowing  than  Canada, 
France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Switzerland as 
far as taxes are concerned. This observation might become more relevant as 
integrated world capital markets narrow differences in interest rates between 
countries. 
4.5.2 
If, for some nontax reasons, a U.S. firm has to finance foreign investment 
using an equity source, subsidiary retained earnings are typically cheaper than 
parent equity transfers, except in Germany where split corporate tax rates dis- 
criminate against retained earnings (table 4.8, col. [4]). Note, however, that the 
cost of capital for subsidiary retained earnings as reported in this study implic- 
itly  assumes that home-country taxes on unrepatriated earnings can be  de- 
ferred. If such deferrals are not allowed in the United States, then the cost of 
capital for foreign investment financed through subsidiary retained earnings 
will be higher for firms that are in a deficit credit position than those reported 
in column (QZ4 
Unlike the foreign tax credit, the main objective of which is to avoid double 
taxation of foreign-source income, tax deferrals have been a source of contro- 
versy in the United States because this provision gives home-based multina- 
tionals a tax incentive to keep placing their earnings in foreign countries. Fur- 
ther, the deferral of the home tax on foreign-source income is often regarded 
as a violation of the principle of tax neutrality between domestic and outward 
foreign investment (capital export neutrality) since taxation of domestic-source 
income generally cannot be deferred. 
Tax Deferral and Subsidiary Retained Earnings 
4.6  Conclusions 
Tax  rules related to international investment significantly raise the cost of 
capital for foreign investment.  The tax costs associated with foreign investment 
will easily put foreign subsidiaries in a disadvantageous position relative to 
local companies. The extent to which tax rules raise the cost of  capital for 
foreign investment varies across investor countries. Firms from countries with 
a dividend imputation scheme may face a lower cost of equity transfers than 
those from countries with no such benefits, such as the United States. 
The evidence presented in this paper suggests that, as an effect of tax rules, 
U.S. foreign subsidiaries that  draw equity transfers from their parent firms 
24. Technically, in such a case, the cost of  capital  for subsidiary  retained earnings becomes 
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likely face a higher cost of capital than local firms in major foreign markets. 
This is an addition to the much heralded  cost-of-funds  disadvantage  in the 
United States. U.S. firms may also face a cost-of-capital disadvantage in for- 
eign markets vis-a-vis competing firms that face low-cost equity transfers due 
to dividend imputation schemes in their home countries. 
There are several additional factors that may add to the competitive burden 
of  U.S. firms operating abroad. Among major investor countries, the United 
States has  the  tightest  rules  regarding  the  exemption  or deferral  of  home- 
country tax on foreign-source income and regarding the limitation of foreign 
tax credits. For example, the Tax  Reform Act of  1986 has made pooling of 
worldwide income more difficult for U.S. firms by confining the eligibility to 
earnings from majority-owned subsidiaries, while many other countries tried 
to adopt the exemption method by statutes or by treaties; unlike its major com- 
petitors, the United States considers a loan that a subsidiary makes to its parent 
to be the equivalent of  a dividend, to which a U.S. surtax may be applied; a 
recent U.S. tax bill (H.R. 5270: Foreign Income Tax Rationalization and Sim- 
plification Act of  1992) includes  a provision  that  repeals  tax  deferral;  the 
United  States is the only major  developed country that does not grant tax- 
sparing credits to developing countries, possibly makmg U.S. multinationals 
face a much higher effective tax rate in developing countries than firms from 
other countries with a treaty including tax-sparing credits. 
As the increasing international integration of financial markets narrows the 
cost-of-funds differentials between countries, tax rules will play a more im- 
portant role in determining  the cost of capital for firms investing in foreign 
markets. Appendix 
Table 4A.1  Cost of Capital Financed through Equity 'Ikansfer of Parent Retained Earnings 
Home 
United  United  Standard 
Host  Japan  Canada  France  Germany  Netherlands  Kingdom  Italy  Sweden  Switzerland  Australia  States  Average  Deviation 
Japan  9.0  11.1  11.7  12.8  10.6  11.3  11.8  10.6  10.6  13.9  10.6  11.3  1.2 
Canada  11.8  8.1  10.4  13.7  9.5  10.1  13.5  10.4  10.4  12.3  9.5  10.9  1.7 
France  11.2  11.6  7.3  11.2  9.7  10.8  15.4  9.0  9.7  16.1  9.7  11.1  2.5 
Germany  11.7  7.9  5.4  9.5  8.2  7.8  6.4  8.2  8.2  7.4  8.3  8.1  1.5 
Netherlands  10.9  8.9  8.3  10.3  7.1  8.0  12.8  7.1  7.1  11.3  7.8  9.1  1.9 
United kngdom  11.8  4.7  8.0  7.7  6.3  7.7  14.0  6.3  6.3  7.7  8.6  8.1  2.5 
Sweden  12.0  10.0  7.2  8.5  7.2  8.2  15.2  7.2  7.8  11.1  8.8  9.4  2.4 
Switzerland  11.4  9.4  7.8  9.6  6.6  7.6  14.4  7.3  6.6  10.5  8.2  9.0  2.3 
Australia  12.1  5.8  12.9  15.1  11.5  12.5  13.3  11.5  11.5  9.0  11.5  11.5  2.3 
United States  10.7  9.5  8.8  10.9  8.3  8.5  11.8  8.3  8.3  11.9  7.6  9.5  1.5 
Italy  10.8  8.3  13.4  13.0  9.1  6.8  9.1  10.8  11.8  14.2  9.9  10.7  2.2 
Average  11.2  8.7  9.2  11.1  8.6  9.0  12.5  8.8  8.9  11.4  9.1  9.9  2.0 
Standard deviation  0.8  2.0  2.4  2.2  1.6  1.8  2.6  1.7  1.9  2.6  1.2  1.9 Table 4A.2  Cost of Capital Financed through Equity Transfer of Parent New Equity 
Home 
United  United  Standard 














9.0  7.3  6.8  2.4 
11.8  5.5  6.2  2.8 
11.2  7.4  4.4  2.1 
11.7  5.2  3.1  1.6 
10.9  5.7  4.8  1.6 
11.8  4.1  4.9  1.5 
10.8  8.2  7.7  8.4 
12.0  6.5  4.3  1.6 
11.4  6.0  4.4  1.5 
12.1  8.2  7.7  3.3 
10.7  6.1  5.1  1.8 
11.2  6.4  5.4  2.6 
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6.4  4.6  10.6  10.6 
5.9  5.3  10.4  10.4 
6.1  5.5  9.0  9.1 
4.5  2.4  8.2  8.2 
4.5  4.6  7.1  7.1 
4.6  5.3  6.3  6.3 
4.0  3.7  10.8  11.8 
4.1  5.5  7.2  7.8 
4.2  4.9  7.3  6.6 
7.4  5.6  11.5  11.5 
4.8  4.4  8.3  8.3 
5.2  4.7  8.8  8.9 
1.0  0.9  1.7  1.9 
4.7  10.6  7.6 
4.4  9.5  7.4 
5.1  9.7  7.3 
2.5  8.3  5.8 
3.6  7.8  5.9 
2.8  8.6  5.7 
4.8  9.9  8.1 
3.8  8.8  6.3 
3.3  8.2  5.9 
3.6  11.5  8.5 
7.6  6.3  3.9 
3.9  9.1  6.8 
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Comment  Joel Slemrod 
In  199  1  the  Organisation  for  Economic  Co-operation  and  Development 
(OECD) published a massive 469-page volume entitled Taxing Profits in a 
Global Economy; its goal was to examine how the OECD member countries 
taxed corporate profits and the potential implication of  these apparent differ- 
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ences in taxation for domestic and international investment flows. Included in 
the study was the most careful calculation up to that time, of the cost of capital 
for domestic, and more specifically,  cross-border direct investments. This vol- 
ume contains scores of charts and thousands of numbers about the cost of capi- 
tal for a company resident in country X investing in country Y,  so many that 
the report itself despairs that *‘it  is difficult to draw any general conclusions 
from such a large quantity of data.” It then proceeds to venture some conclu- 
sions, including that “all countries appear to discourage outward investment 
compared to domestic investment by their resident companies. They also place 
a high effective tax rate on inward investment by foreign companies compared 
to domestic companies and compared to domestic investment by resident com- 
panies. Further, this result holds irrespective of  the means of  financing the 
subsidiary chosen by the parent, unless the subsidiary merely retains its earn- 
ings” (OECD 1991, 158). The OECD report also concludes that, on average, 
the required return of Japanese multinationals is significantly higher than that 
of U.S. multinationals, except for investments located in Japan itself. 
In this paper Joosung Jun uses the OECD data and apparently uses some- 
thing very similar to the OECD methodology to arrive at more or less these 
same conclusions as in the OECD report. In spite of the apparent similarity in 
methodology and conclusions, this paper contains several noteworthy incre- 
mental contributions. Let me try to summarize them. 
1. The cost-of-capital measures are derived in a more straightforward way, 
and the results are presented in a tighter, and to my mind, clearer way than in 
the OECD report. 
2.  The cost-of-capital calculations highlight the role of  the assumptions 
made about the parent company’s source of financing. Although column (1) of 
Junk table 4.6 is, except for one entry, exactly the same as the information in 
the OECD report’s table 5.1, the others are new, but very similar to the OECD 
calculations, particularly in the ordering. The differences arise because the 
OECD report presents cost-of-capital calculations only under the assumption 
that the parent companies finance their subsidiaries using a weighted average 
of retentions, new equity, and debt, the same weighted average for all coun- 
tries. Jun presents the cost of calculation separately for each kind of financing. 
3. It highlights the role in the cost of capital of corporate and personal tax 
integration, and particularly how  foreign owners are treated under these re- 
gimes (see also Devereux and Freeman 1994). In most cases integration bene- 
fits are not passed on to foreign owners, and the benefits of integration to do- 
mestic shareholders are not available on foreign direct investment.  With regard 
to the former restriction, Jun devotes his table 4.7 to cost-of-capital calcula- 
tions assuming that foreign firms “have enough flexibility” to avoid such statu- 
tory restrictions, suggesting that this may be closer to the truth than assuming 
the restrictions are binding. This is an important assertion that cries out for 
some supporting evidence. Can it really be as easy as setting up two tiers of 121  The Impact of International Tax  Rules on the Cost of Capital 
affiliate corporations so that the dividends paid from the first to the second-tier 
affiliate receive the imputation credit? 
4. It highlights the empirical and conceptual importance of  local debt fi- 
nancing and makes the interesting point that, considering tax advantages, local 
debt financing looks even more attractive than in a domestic context, because 
it can potentially avoid three, rather than two, layers of tax on equity-financed 
capital. 
Although this paper raises insightful new issues within the now-standard 
framework introduced by  King-Fullerton and used by  the OECD, it does not 
extend this framework in some directions that I believe are critical to under- 
standing the impact of taxation on foreign direct investment. 
For example, the  standard model ignores differences in  how  domestic- 
source and foreign-source income are calculated by  a given country. For ex- 
ample, the United States uses an earnings and profits concept to measure the 
foreign-source income for the purpose of calculating the limitation on the for- 
eign tax credit: this is different from both the U.S. concept of taxable income 
and any host country’s definition of income; accelerated depreciation does not 
apply, nor are there research and development or investment tax credits. 
The definition of  what is domestic-source and what is foreign-source in- 
come also differs across countries. This raises the possibility of double or zero 
taxation, even when tax rates are the same across countries. Thus, it is crucial 
to examine the effect on the cost of capital of such provisions as interest alloca- 
tion rules, R&D allocation rules, and the U.S. export-source rule, under which 
half of the income earned on U.S.-produced exports is denoted foreign source. 
This is of no importance to a purely domestic company, but to a multinational 
in an  excess credit position, it expands the foreign tax credit limit and can 
thereby  increase the amount of  foreign income taxes that  can be  credited 
against U.S. tax liability. 
The most glaring omission in the standard model is income shifting. Implic- 
itly,  it assumes that income is costlessly observable by  the tax enforcement 
agency. That is an untenable assumption in a closed domestic economy. It is 
completely unrealistic in an open economy, where the very concept of where 
income is earned is slippery, and there is substantial empirical evidence of 
nontrivial income shifting done by  multinational enterprises. An  important 
question is to what extent the ability to shift taxable income from high-tax to 
low-tax countries offsets the tax disadvantage to multinationals due to overlap- 
ping jurisdictions that is documented in Junk paper and others. The potential 
for income shifting also affects the allocation of  real investment. Ireland is 
more attractive than otherwise as a site for multinational investment because it 
has a low statutory corporation income tax that makes it a magnet for income 
shifting. The same marginal effective tax rate on investment could be achieved 
with a higher statutory tax rate and more nonrate incentives such as accelerated 
depreciation, but this would not be as attractive for real investment, as multina- 122  Joosung Jun 
tionals look ahead to the possibility that once real operations are located in 
Ireland, income shifting can occur. What is required  is an “income shifting 
adjusted” cost of capital, as calculated in Hines and Rice (1994) and Grubert 
and Slemrod (1993). 
Finally, I suggest that there is a large payoff for more disaggregated studies 
of the taxation of cross-border investment. For example, the residual tax im- 
posed upon repatriation is likely to place a large penalty on a U.S. company 
which  operates  predominantly  in  low-tax  countries,  but  not  on  companies 
which operate largely in high-tax countries. In this sense, the issue is not coun- 
try  specific as much  as it is sector specific or firm specific. A firm-specific 
approach  would  allow  one  to  take  advantage  of  information  concerning 
whether a firm is in an excess or deficit foreign tax credit position. 
I would  like to close my remarks with a few random thoughts about the 
thriving cost-of-capital “industry,” of which this paper is a part. First, an easy 
point. It is well documented that cost-of-capital calculations such as those in 
this paper are very sensitive to essentially arbitrary assumptions about such 
things as rate of inflation, real rate of return, and the sources of marginal fi- 
nancing. On a more constructive note, I encourage the participants in this in- 
dustry to do more to justify its existence. In particular, it remains to be seen 
whether the marginal effective tax rates that are generated by these procedures 
are more successful in explaining phenomena  such as the pattern  of  foreign 
direct investment than less conceptually appealing, but also less arbitrary, alter- 
natives based on average tax rates. 
To sum up, this paper by Joosung Jun is a careful and thoughtful addition to 
the literature that uses the King-Fullerton framework to address the tax disin- 
centives to foreign direct investment. This framework needs to be extended to 
properly address some of the critical issues in the taxation of multinational cor- 
porations. 
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